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Peasants’ Revolt: Why Congress Should 
Eliminate the Tax Benefits on  
Dead Peasant Insurance 
 
Patrick Burns 
Corporate-owned life insurance (“COLI”) is a form of insurance in which an employer 
takes out a life insurance policy on the life of one of its employees. COLI is legal under 
state insurable interest statutes because employers have a financial incentive in the 
continuation of certain “key employees.” However, in the past two decades, use of COLI 
has increased as large corporations have begun to insure larger percentages of their 
workers, even low-wage employees. This widespread practice presents many public policy 
concerns: corporations profit by reaping the death benefits when an employee dies and 
federal tax law permits the corporations to exclude the proceeds from gross income. 
Congress attempted to curb COLI by limiting a corporation from insuring certain types 
of employees, but corporations continue to insure large percentages of their employees. 
 
This Note argues that Congress should go further in eliminating COLI due to the 
dangerous incentives that it provides to employers in the event of an employee’s death. In 
the modern employment context, all employees are replaceable and private businesses 
should not reap federal tax benefits from the death of its employees. This Note proposes 
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In 2008, Irma Johnson mistakenly received a check for $1.5 million 
from an insurance company following the death of her husband, Daniel 
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Johnson.1 The check should have been sent to Wal-Mart, where Dan 
worked for only a couple months before being fired in 2001.2 Wal-Mart 
had taken out a life insurance policy on Dan in 2001 and held the 
beneficial interest under the policy until his death.3 Wal-Mart’s life 
insurance policy is an example of a “Dead Peasant” insurance policy, 
where an employer takes out a life insurance policy on a rank-and-file 
employee in order to receive tax-free death benefits. 
Dead Peasant policies represent extreme forms of corporate-owned 
life insurance (“COLI”), a practice whereby an employer takes out a life 
insurance policy on a key employee who is integral to the company’s 
success to protect the employer in the case of the employee’s death. While 
some courts have invalidated such policies, modern COLI arrangements 
persist as large corporations continue to take out insurance policies on a 
large number of their employees. The question is whether these policies 
are legitimate protections against loss, or whether they represent a scheme 
that is coldly calculated to fill the coffers of private corporations. This Note 
argues that COLI should be limited because it rewards employers when 
their employees die quickly. 
Courts and legislatures have already prohibited Stranger-Owned 
Life Insurance (“STOLI”), where an individual gambles on the life of a 
stranger. This Note argues that COLI represents a similar gamble and that 
legislatures and courts should prohibit it as they have prohibited STOLI 
policies. Additionally, although Congress has not restricted COLI, it has 
acted by limiting tax advantages that companies enjoy through COLI. This 
Note proposes that state and federal laws should go further in restricting 
COLI because in the modern employment relationship, employers do 
not need to be compensated following the death of an employee, even 
so-called “key persons.” 
Part I of this Note summarizes the history of the insurable interest 
requirement and outlines the differences between STOLI policies, 
viatical settlements, COLI, and Dead Peasant policies. Part II identifies 
several public policy concerns created by COLI and explains why such 
policies are dangerous. Part III summarizes congressional amendments 
that are designed to limit tax advantages of COLI and analyzes the 
current state of the law. Part IV proposes three possible legal solutions 
for preventing the abusive nature of COLI, and ultimately recommends 
 
 1. Claire Shipman & Chris Strathmann, Are ‘Dead Peasant’ Life Insurance Policies Fair?, ABC 
News (Oct. 2, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/dead-peasant-life-insurance-policies-fair/ 
story?id=8724327. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. Filmmaker Michael Moore documented Irma’s shock and subsequent realization that Wal-
Mart would be collecting millions of dollars from her husband’s death in Moore’s 2009 film Capitalism: 
A Love Story. Id. 
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the elimination of all tax benefits to prevent the inherent dangers of such 
policies. 
I.  Historical Background 
A. History of the Insurable Interest Requirement 
Prior to 1774, English courts permitted life-wagering contracts where 
one citizen would gamble on the death of another by taking out a life 
insurance policy on that person.4 It did not matter if the purchaser was 
related to or knew the insured.5 In 1774, however, the English Parliament 
enacted a statute requiring life insurance policies to contain an insurable 
interest, or an interest by the purchaser of the life insurance policy in the 
longevity of the insured.6 In other words, one who took out the policy 
must have had some incentive for the insured to continue living. The 
public policy rationale for enacting an insurable interest requirement in 
1774 was that permitting a person to gamble on another’s life could 
induce the gambler to kill the insured.7 Consequently, there had to be an 
incentive for the policyholder to want the insured to live longer to avoid 
the potential moral hazard.8 
As the United States adopted English common law, states required 
an insurable interest for life insurance policies, either through statutes or 
common law.9 Under these statutes and court decisions, factors that could 
satisfy the insurable interest included “blood relation” and “love and 
affection” to the insured.10 The logic behind these factors was simple: if one 
loves or is related by blood to the insured, she would not be induced to kill 
the insured.11 Additionally, statutes and common law decisions often 
 
 4. Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical 
Reassessment, 53 Drake L. Rev. 477, 481 (2005). 
 5. See id. Interestingly, many of the wagering contracts were taken out on a person accused of a 
capital crime and the gamble for the purchaser was whether the conviction and punishment would 
stand. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Eryn Mathews, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of 
Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 521, 542 (2008). Modern courts also cite prevention 
of murder as a rationale for the insurable interest requirement. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A.2d 
96, 98 (Md. 1992). 
 8. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876) (“A man cannot take out 
insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected with him as to 
make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to him.”). 
 9. Id. In Schaefer, Justice Bradley summarized how the insurable interest adoption gradually 
migrated from England to the United States: “In this country, statutes [requiring an insurable interest] 
have been passed in some of the States; but where they have not been, in most cases either the English 
statutes have been considered as operative, or the older common law has been followed.” Id. 
 10. Mathews, supra note 7, at 543.  
 11. Id. at 542 (noting that the initial intent for the insurable interest requirement was deterring 
murder). The rationale assumed that blood relatives and persons bound by love and affection would 
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permitted a “substantial economic interest” as a basis for satisfying the 
insurable interest requirement.12 
B. STOLI: A Way Around the Insurable Interest Requirement 
1. The Origins of STOLI 
STOLI transactions occur when an individual takes out a life 
insurance policy and transfers the policy to a stranger in exchange for 
money. STOLI transactions date back to the enactment of insurable 
interest statutes in England.13 A typical STOLI transaction is set up in this 
way: An elderly person is offered a sum of money in exchange for taking 
out a life insurance policy on her own life and transferring it immediately 
to an investor, who will fund the premiums.14 The investor holds the policy 
and receives the death benefits when the elderly person dies.15 Because 
the elderly person technically took out the policy on herself, the 
transaction is a way to evade the insurable interest statute because it 
permits the investor to gamble on the person’s life. As a result, American 
courts and legislatures began restricting the legality of such policies. 
After the gradual state-by-state adoption of the insurable interest 
requirement in the United States, the Supreme Court heard the first case 
involving a STOLI transaction in Warnock v. Davis in 1881.16 In Warnock, 
Henry Crosser took out a $5000 life insurance policy on his own life and 
immediately transferred his interest to a group of investors who agreed to 
pay the premiums and pay Crosser’s wife a ten percent ($500) 
commission.17 The insurer argued that the contract was void for lacking 
an insurable interest; even though Crosser had an insurable interest in his 
own life, the formation and assignment of the contract was a sham that 
allowed the investors to obtain an illegal wagering contract.18 The Court 
invalidated the agreement for lack of an insurable interest because it was 
not transferred in good faith.19 Essentially, lack of good faith meant that 
Crosser only agreed to the policy to facilitate the transfer to the investors.20 
Therefore, good faith became the legal standard by which a transfer of a 
 
not want to kill each other, but it is merely a theory. In reality, many blood relationships, from Cain 
and Abel to the pornographers and the Mitchell Brothers, have ended in familial homicide. 
 12. Id. at 543. 
 13. Maria Fleisher, Comment, Stranger Originated Life Insurance: Finding a Modern Cure for an 
Age-Old Problem, 41 Cumb. L. Rev. 569, 570–71 (2011). 
 14. Id. at 570. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 104 U.S. 775 (1881). 
 17. Id. at 775. 
 18. Id. at 778. 
 19. Id. at 781–83. 
 20. Id. at 782. 
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life insurance contract to a stranger would be legal: if the individual took 
out the policy in good faith, any assignment of the policy would be valid. If 
the policy was not procured in good faith, it represented an attempt to 
evade the insurable interest requirement and the policy would be 
invalidated. 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refined the criteria for a life 
insurance contract to satisfy the insurable interest requirement. In 
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, the Court held that an 
insurable interest need only exist “at the time of taking out the policy.”21 
The Court reemphasized that if an insured takes out a policy in good 
faith, it would be held valid.22 Therefore, as long as a policy was valid at 
its inception and later transferred, it satisfied the insurable interest 
requirement. In Grigsby v. Russell, the Court explained that because life 
insurance contracts should be given the “ordinary characteristics of 
property,” the policyholder retained the right to transfer it to a group of 
investors so long as the policy was taken out in good faith.23 
2. The Viatical Settlement Market 
With the Supreme Court condoning the free transfer of life insurance 
policies so long as policyholders agreed to them in good faith, investors 
eventually found a way to profit by receiving the transfer of such policies. 
The transfer of a life insurance policy to pay for medical services for 
treatment of a disease is called a “viatical settlement.”24 The 1980s, the 
height of the AIDS epidemic, saw the rise of a viatical settlement 
industry,25 whereby individuals diagnosed with AIDS began transferring 
their life insurance policies to third-party investors for a sum of money.26 
The viatical settlement industry refers to the widespread practice of 
transferring life insurance contracts in exchange for cash.27 At the time, 
AIDS frequently became fatal soon after diagnosis. As a result, those 
afflicted with the disease often needed fast cash for treatment.28 Investors 
were happy to be on the purchasing end of the policies—AIDS patients 
 
 21. 94 U.S. 457, 462 (1876). 
 22. Id. at 460. 
 23. 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911). 
 24. Id. at 286. 
 25. Some courts and scholars use the term “life settlement” rather than “viatical settlement.” For 
clarity, this Note uses viatical settlement, but the terms are interchangeable. See Sachin Kohli, Pricing 
Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 
54 Buff. L. Rev. 279, 281 (2006) (“The transaction of selling one’s policy to a life settlement provider 
is referred to as either a viatical settlement or a life settlement.”). 
 26. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance 
Policies, 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 449, 450 (2003). 
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had short life expectancies, which allowed investors to profit 
handsomely—and AIDS victims could take advantage of cash payments 
on policies that would not otherwise help them after their deaths.29 
The viatical settlement industry has grown rapidly in the past few 
decades, expanding to cover many diseases.30 In 1989, life insurance 
contracts were worth an estimated total of $5 million.31 In 1995, an 
estimated $200 million worth of viatical settlements were sold.32 In 2005, 
that figure rose to an estimated $13 billion.33 Some experts predict that 
the total value of the viatical settlement industry could reach $160 billion 
by 2030.34 The growth of the industry has also led to the growth of STOLI 
transactions, probably because it is often unclear whether a life insurance 
policy was assigned in good faith. Therefore, STOLI policies disguise 
themselves as legitimate viatical settlements. 
Viatical settlements, or any transfers of life insurance done in good 
faith, are legal on the basis that an individual may freely transfer his or 
her own property; however, some critics have called for regulation of the 
industry due to the disparity in bargaining power between a large company 
and a terminally ill individual in need of money.35 Another concern might 
be that individuals could conceal an illness only to obtain a policy and flip 
it immediately to a group of investors. Critical evaluations of the viatical 
settlement industry are beyond the scope of this Note. 
This Note describes the viatical settlement industry to highlight the 
problem of modern STOLI schemes, which grew out of the burgeoning 
viatical settlement industry. The key difference between viatical 
settlements and STOLI policies is that under a viatical settlement the 
insured originally agreed to the policy in good faith and intended to 
remain the beneficiary, whereas with STOLI transactions, the insured 
took out the policy in bad faith only for the purpose of transferring it to 
 
 29. Id. at 451 (“Policyholders benefit from improvements in the quality of their final days, and 
investors benefit by having the opportunity to invest in a previously inaccessible asset class.”). 
 30. Joy D. Kosiewicz, Comment, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement 
Industry, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 701, 701–02 (1998). 
 31. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Life Insurers Face the Future, Grudgingly, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 2006, 
at A11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Denise M. Schultz, Angels of Mercy or Greedy Capitalists? Buying Life Insurance Policies 
from the Terminally Ill, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 99, 110 (1996) (arguing for the codification of state viatical 
regulations because they “seek to ensure that viatical settlement companies do not take advantage of a 
viator’s vulnerability”); see also Miriam R. Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy 
Implications of Viatical Settlements, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1013, 1031 n.92 (1998) (arguing that some 
regulations that allow the viator to rescind a contract within thirty days may set up a “bargaining 
game” that works to the viator’s disadvantage). See generally Kosiewicz, supra note 30. 
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an investor. While viatical settlements are valid under the law,36 courts 
have construed STOLI policies as illegitimate contracts that evade 
insurable interest laws.37 COLI policies also lack an insurable interest in 
the modern employment context. 
3. Modern STOLI Arrangements 
In the past decade, the litigation concerning STOLI policies has 
increased as investors have become more sophisticated in concealing 
STOLI schemes from insurers.38 A federal district court in New Jersey 
recently summarized a typical modern STOLI transaction: 
A typical STOLI transaction is structured as follows. An agent 
attempts to sell a life insurance policy to an elderly insurable 
candidate, and offers the candidate up-front cash in exchange for 
promising a future sale of the policy. The agent informs the candidate 
that the candidate will be able to obtain the policy at virtually no cost 
to himself, because the agent has secured non-recourse financing to 
purchase the policy. The candidate then acts as a “nominal grantor” of 
a life insurance trust that is used to apply for the policy. “At that time, 
the agent will tell the insured that, in all probability, the policy will be 
sold to investors for a price that will pay the loan and accrued interest, 
leaving a profit to split between the agent and the insured.”39 
The use of a trust to facilitate the transfer agreement is so common 
in STOLI transactions that many states have explicitly mentioned the use 
of trusts in their insurable interest laws.40 Most cases involve a life 
insurance policy transferred by an individual to a group of investors and 
the cases normally turn on a finding of good faith.41 A policy is purchased 
in good faith when a person does not intend to transfer the policy at the 
 
 36. See Kosiewicz, supra note 30, at 701 (“Viatical settlements are available in all 50 states.”). For 
an example of a state viatical settlement statute, see Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10113.1–13.3 (West 2013). 
 37. See, e.g., Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Brasner, No. 10-80804, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156297, at *32–33 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2011) (invalidating a life insurance policy transferred without good faith and stating 
that it “amounts to an illegal wagering contract”); see also AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. 
Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim against a 
bad faith transfer of a life insurance policy, stating: “Assuming the truth of the allegations of the amended 
complaint as true, as the court must at this stage, the procurement and the assignment of the policies was 
not done in good faith, but was part of a scheme devised by defendants to obtain interests in insurance 
policies . . . in which the defendants had no insurable interest”). 
 38. See Joseph J. Hasman et al., Recent Developments in Health Insurance, Life Insurance, and 
Disability Insurance Law, 47 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 247, 273–76 (2011) (summarizing recent 
developments of STOLI litigation). 
 39. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d. 882, 885 (D.N.J. 2009) (citation omitted).  
 40. See, e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 10110.1(d) (“Trusts and special purpose entities that are used to 
apply for and initiate the issuance of policies of insurance for investors, where one or more 
beneficiaries of those trusts or special purpose entities do not have an insurable interest in the life of 
the insured, violate the insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life.”).  
 41. See, e.g., Pruco Life Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156297, at *23; see also Lincoln Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 722 F. Supp. 2d. 546 (D. Del. 2010). 
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policy’s inception.42 If a transaction lacks good faith because the insured 
never meant to remain as policy beneficiary, then the contract is a STOLI 
transaction rather than a viatical settlement, and therefore violates the 
insurable interest requirement. 
Nearly all U.S. jurisdictions have adopted the insurable interest 
requirement for life insurance contracts.43 States differ, however, as to 
when an insurable interest is required to exist in order for a policy to be 
upheld. A minority of states have enacted strict insurable interest laws 
that require the insurable interest to exist at the time of the insured’s 
death.44 However, forty-four states allow an individual to freely transfer 
the policy so long as the contract was taken out and transferred in good 
faith.45 Thus, most modern STOLI cases turn on a factual determination 
of whether the insured acted in good faith in procuring and transferring 
the policy.46 
C. COLI: A New Face for an Old Problem 
1. The Emergence of COLI 
COLI, also referred to as employer-owned life insurance (“EOLI”), 
is a form of a life insurance contract between an employer and employee.47 
The corporation or employer owns the life insurance policy on the 
employee, pays the premiums, and usually becomes the sole beneficiary 
under the contract. Therefore, the employer collects any death benefits 
when the insured employee dies. Many arrangements might include a 
small percentage payout for the employee’s family. 
COLI policies originally developed for the benefit of companies 
taking out so-called “key-man” or “key-person” life insurance policies on 
important employees whose deaths might result in financial loss to the 
company.48 These types of policies “came to be accepted when [they] 
involved key personnel and bore a rational relationship to the costs or 
losses that might be expected to be incurred as a result of the death of the 
 
 42. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911). 
 43. Swisher, supra note 4, at 479. 
 44. Mathews, supra note 7, at 546. 
 45. Id. at 547. 
 46. For cases that turned on factual determinations of a good faith transfer, see supra note 41. 
 47. COLI is a bit of a misnomer because it applies not solely to corporations but to all profit-
making companies such as partnerships, business trusts, and limited liability partnerships. Stephan R. 
Leimberg & Howard M. Zaritsky, IRS Provides New and Substantial Guidance on Employer-Owned 
Life Insurance, Est. Plan., Aug. 2009. at 3, 4 n.3. While others use the term EOLI, for simplicity this 
Note will continue to use the term COLI. 
 48. See Mathews, supra note 7, at 544; see also Charity Rush, Comment, Corporate-Owned Life 
Insurance (A/K/A ‘Dead Peasant’ or ‘Dead Janitor’ Policies): Has Texas Buried the Insurable Interest 
Requirement?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2004). 
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person being insured.”49 States that adopted this exception for key-person 
insurance usually required the consent of the insured employee.50 
The rationale behind key-person COLI policies is simple: a 
company will lose financially if the key employee dies. An extreme 
example of this would involve former Apple CEO Steve Jobs; prior to 
Jobs’ death, Apple would presumably have an interest in Jobs staying 
alive. Therefore, it would be in Apple’s best financial interest to take out 
life insurance on Jobs’ life. Allowing this type of life insurance contract 
satisfies two concerns: 1) Apple would not be incentivized for Jobs to die 
early, given his value to the company, and 2) Apple would avoid a 
financial loss in the case of Jobs’ death by being compensated through 
the policy’s death benefits.51 
The main problem with this rationale is that it is difficult to determine 
which employees constitute key people to a company. While Jobs would 
certainly be considered a key person, would a high-profile manager of 
Apple retail stores who earns $150,000 a year be considered a key 
employee? Would it matter if the employee owned part of the company 
and if so, how much would the employee have to own in order to be 
considered a key person? What about an employee who works in the 
Apple retail store but makes $20.00 per hour? Would it matter if that 
same employee only made minimum wage? The answers to these 
questions are difficult and demonstrate the gray area created by allowing 
an employer to insure key employees. 
Today, COLI policies are much broader and may extend to “any 
employee regardless of the length of employment or the value of the 
employee’s services.”52 Failing to comply with a state’s consent and 
notice requirements, rather than lacking an insurable interest, tends to be 
the only reason that COLI policies are invalidated. Some states, such as 
Georgia, allow employers to have an insurable interest in retired 
employees who do not currently work for the employer.53 
 
 49. Stephan R. Leimberg & Albert E. Gibbons, COLI, BOLI, TOLI and ‘Insurable Interests’, 
Est. Plan., July 2001, at 333, 333 (recognizing that under English common law no such prohibition 
existed). 
 50. Id. at 334.  
 51. There is no indication Apple collected on a life insurance policy following Jobs’ death. The 
hypothetical is used to demonstrate an extreme example of the rationale behind key-man insurance 
policies. It is possible that, given Jobs’ medical condition, an insurer would not ensure Jobs or that the 
premiums would be too high for Apple to take out such a policy. 
 52. Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d. 762, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
 53. See Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-3(d)(2) (2013) (permitting employers to have an insurable interest in 
any “employee,” which includes retired employees). Georgia’s prior insurable interest statute defined 
employee more broadly, including dependents of any employee. See George Steven Swan, The Law and 
Economics of Company-Owned Life Insurance (COLI): Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 27 S. Ill. U. L.J. 357, 371 (2003). As of 2006, Georgia’s legislature removed the term 
“dependent of any employee” from Georgia’s insurable interest statute. Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-3(d)(2). 
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2. Dead Peasant Insurance 
Dead Peasant policies are extreme forms of COLI, whereby an 
employer insures a large percentage of its employees, even rank-and-file 
employees who are unlikely to be integral to the company’s success. In 
the 1990s and 2000s, employers began to expand the number and range 
of employees who they claimed to be key persons to include even those 
who made relatively small salaries.54 In most cases, the employees did not 
know that they were being covered.55 
These policies are often pejoratively called “Dead Peasant” or “Dead 
Janitor” policies.56 Interestingly, the origin of the term “Dead Peasant” 
comes from internal memos57 of an insurance company that became part of 
the court’s record in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit invalidated several COLI policies as “sham transactions.”58 Using 
the terms “peasants” or “janitors” emphasizes the unimportance of the 
employees covered and exposes the fact that many COLI policies run 
contrary to the original intent behind key-person insurance. 
3. Judicial Restraints on COLI 
One of the first cases to highlight the potential abusive nature of 
COLI policies involved the death of Felipe Tillman documented by the 
Wall Street Journal in 1992.59 Tillman’s company, Camelot Music Inc. 
(“Camelot”), purchased a COLI policy on Tillman and collected $339,302 
following his death.60 Tillman was unaware of the policy, and his family 
only found out after his death.61 In an article about his death, Felipe’s 
brother Anthony Tillman expressed shock that a company could profit 
off an employee’s death without notice to the employee or his family: “If 
someone is going to use your name for something, even though you’re an 
 
 54. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Companies Profit on Workers’ Deaths Through ‘Dead 
Peasants’ Insurance, Wall St. J. (Apr. 19, 2002, 12:13 AM), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/april_19.htm. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Mike Myers, How “Dead Peasant” Insurance Got Its Name, Contingent Fee Bus. Litig. 
Blog (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.contingentfeeblog.com/2008/08/articles/corporate-owned-life-
insurance/how-dead-peasant-insurance-got-its-name. 
 57. Id. (quoting the exact language in the memorandum as stating “I want a summary sheet that 
has . . . the Dead Peasants in the third column”). 
 58. Id. (“Thus, the phrase ‘dead peasant insurance’ is not a creation of the media. It is a term used 
within the insurance industry to describe employees whose lives are insured by policies of corporate 
owned life insurance for an employer’s benefit.”). 
 59. Schultz & Francis, supra note 54. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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employee of theirs, you should know what’s going on in your name . . . 
[i]t isn’t fair.”62 
Years later, Tillman’s estate sued Camelot under an Oklahoma 
statute that allows insurance proceeds to be recovered if an insurance 
contract did not contain an insurable interest on the insured’s life.63 On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
that Camelot did not have an insurable interest in Tillman because it 
could not prove that Tillman’s value to the company outweighed any 
potential gain from insurance proceeds following his death.64 This Note 
argues below that most employees’ insurance policies similarly lack an 
insurable interest because most employees are replaceable. 
Mayo v. Hartford Life Insurance Co.,65 a case involving a class action 
lawsuit against three large corporations, is perhaps the most famous case 
involving a Dead Peasant policy. In Mayo, Camelot, Transworld 
Entertainment Corporation, and Wal-Mart (collectively “corporate 
defendants”), challenging the death benefits received from COLI 
policies.66 The class of plaintiffs included former employees and estates of 
deceased employees of the corporate defendants.67 The corporate 
defendants had purchased COLI policies on a large number of their 
employees during the disputed time period: Camelot had purchased life 
insurance on every employee that worked more than twenty hours per 
week and Wal-Mart had purchased policies on every hourly employee.68 
The issue in the case concerned the validity of the policies under Texas 
insurable interest statutes and whether the corporate defendants could 
retain money collected as death benefits on the deceased former 
employees.69 
The portion of the case that involved Wal-Mart only concerned the 
validity of Wal-Mart’s policy to insure all hourly employees. The 
plaintiffs argued that the corporate defendants’ COLI practice violated 
the Texas insurable interest statute because the companies did not have a 
valid insurable interest in the employees.70 Therefore, the company was 
not entitled to be a beneficiary of the policy or to keep any death 
benefits. Wal-Mart argued that it had a valid insurable interest in all of 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Tillman ex rel. Estate of Tillman v. Camelot Music, Inc., No. 02-0761, 2005 WL 3436484, at *1 
(N.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2005). 
 64. Tillman ex rel. Estate of Tillman v. Camelot Music, Inc., 408 F.3d 1300, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 
2005), on remand, 2005 WL 3436484, at *1. 
 65. 220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 66. Id. at 722. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 722–24. 
 69. Id. at 722. 
 70. Id. at 724. 
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its employees’ lives because “‘as a group’ all employees were ‘important 
to the company’s profitability and to the continuing functioning of its 
business.’”71 
The District Court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument and held that Wal-
Mart’s practice of insuring all hourly employees violated the insurable 
interest requirement.72 The court reasoned that the COLI policies were 
against public policy because Wal-Mart could not prove that it did not 
have an incentive in procuring the early death of its employees.73 The 
decision reemphasized the original policy arguments for creating the 
insurable interest requirement: the policyholder should not have an 
interest in the speedy death of the insured in order to reap a lucrative 
payout.74 Part II.B of this Note points out several ways an employer 
might be incentivized to accelerate the death of its employee. 
Tillman and Mayo represent cases in which extreme forms of 
COLI—or Dead Peasant policies—were invalidated due to a lack of an 
insurable interest under a specific state statute. These cases demonstrate 
that there are limits to a company’s abuse of the COLI system with 
extreme policies that cover nearly all rank-and-file employees. However, 
as this Note argues in Part II, COLI policies create policy concerns in 
general. These extreme cases are not the only types of policies that 
courts and legislatures should be concerned with because many modern 
day insurance policies lack an insurable interest. 
II.  Policy Concerns for COLI 
Aside from courts, scholars have often criticized Dead Peasant 
policies as being against public policy.75 Most of this criticism has focused 
on the fact that the policies have often lacked consent and notice.76 
However, COLI policies create several other public policy concerns: 
1) the policies lack a legitimate insurable interest because there is often 
an arbitrary connection between the employee’s value to the company 
and the financial gain that an employer can make from the employee’s 
death; 2) the policies create an improper incentive for employers to 
accelerate the deaths of their employees; 3) the policies are funded by 
American taxpayers for the benefit of both the employers and insurance 
 
 71. Rush, supra note 48, at 149 (quoting Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801–
03 (S.D. Tex. 2002)). 
 72. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme 
That Takes Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 653, 676–77 (2004). 
 76. Id. (“It is unseemly for businesses to benefit from the deaths of their employees, some of 
whom may have been terminated many years before, without the employees’ having agreed to the 
arrangement or, in fact, having known about it.”). 
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companies; and 4) the policies are morally reprehensible as a form of 
life-wagering similar to STOLI policies. 
A. COLI Lacks a Legitimate Insurable Interest 
Charles de Gaulle is credited with the famous phrase: “The 
cemeteries of the world are full of indispensable men.”77 As callous as it 
sounds, there is truth to the quote in the modern employment relationship. 
Most large companies are able to replace key employees without being 
subject to financial ruin. If all employees are replaceable, then all COLI 
policies lack a legitimate insurable interest. Even for employees who are 
perceived as valuable to a company, a life insurance payout is not 
adequate to compensate the company for the loss. Even Jobs, who might 
have been one of the people most indispensable to his company, was 
arguably replaced with relative ease by Apple, and even if this were not 
the case, a life insurance payout would be inadequate to compensate for 
the loss of Jobs to the company.78 
While many claim that Apple has thrived because Jobs has left the 
company in great shape to succeed,79 it is apparent that Apple would not 
have benefitted from an insurance payout upon Jobs’ death in the long 
term. Any money paid out by the policy would have only added extra 
lining to the company’s profits. In order to remain competitive over time, 
many believe that Apple must remain a leading innovator.80 In other 
words, to the extent that Jobs was irreplaceable for his ability to 
 
 77. Steve Lohr, Op-Ed., One Day You’re Indispensable, the Next Day . . ., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 
2009, at WK3. 
 78. Art Levinson replaced Jobs as Chairman of the Board and Tim Cook became CEO and both 
were highly qualified to fill in. Levinson served as CEO of Genentech for fourteen years, wrote or co-
wrote over eighty published scientific papers, and was named as inventor on eleven U.S. patents. 
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, The Man Who Replaced Steve Jobs as Chairman of the Board, CNN Money 
(Nov. 16, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/16/the-man-who-replaced-steve-jobs-
as-chairman-of-the-board. Institutional Investor named him “America’s Best CEO” in biotech for four 
straight years, and Businessweek named him one of the best managers in 2004 and 2005. Id. Cook 
served as Apple’s Chief Operating Officer for seven years and had over twelve years of executive 
experience working at Compaq and IBM. Steven Musil, A Look at Tim Cook, the Man Replacing 
Steve Jobs, CNET News (Aug. 24, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-20096918-37/a-
look-at-tim-cook-the-man-replacing-steve-jobs. In the year following Jobs’ death, Apple continued to 
thrive. In 2011, the company held a market capitalization worth $629.4 billion and put out the 
iPhone 5, which sold between six and ten million units within two weeks. Jon Swartz, Year After Jobs’ 
Death, How High Can Apple Fly?, USA Today, Oct. 5, 2012, at A1. At one point in 2012, Apple stock 
shares were up over eighty percent from the time of Jobs’ death. David Goldman, Apple’s Post-Steve 
Tipping Point, CNN Money (Oct. 5, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/05/ 
technology/apple-steve-jobs/index.html. The Apple stock price has declined since 2012, but is still well 
above the below $400 a share that it was trading for when Jobs died. Balaji Viswanathan, Why Is 
Apple Stock Falling Down?, Forbes (Feb. 13, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/ 
2013/02/13/why-is-apple-stock-falling-down. 
 79. Swartz, supra note 78. 
 80. Id. 
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innovate, a cash payment from a life insurance policy would not have 
helped Apple stay on top of the tech market. This analogy is simplified to 
illustrate that even employees who are seen as integral to a company’s 
success are replaceable to some extent. 
The Apple example highlights the fact that employers, especially 
large corporations, do not need insurance proceeds to serve as protection 
against the possibility of losing important employees. Companies 
especially do not need tax breaks for the proceeds from such policies.81 A 
true insurable interest does not exist in the modern employment 
relationship; employees have become dispensable and companies have 
learned to cope with the loss of any employee, even the most highly paid 
officer. 
The primary rationale behind life insurance is to make sure that a 
family is not left destitute in the case of a family member’s death. While 
this rationale might exist for some small businesses, it does not exist for 
large corporations. Thus, the modern employment context resembles a 
famous exchange between James Bond and his nemesis Auric Goldfinger 
in the 1964 movie Goldfinger: 
Goldfinger [Speaking to Bond, who is about to be cut in half by a 
laser]: “There is nothing you can talk to me about that I don’t already 
know.” 
Bond: “Well you’re forgetting one thing. If I fail to report, 008 replaces 
me.” 
Goldfinger: “I trust he will be more successful.”82 
As challenging or difficult as any job may be, a corporation will not 
be left destitute simply due to the death of one employee. Modern day 
employers can survive the loss of an employee without reaping federal 
tax benefits. 
B. Accelerating the Death of the Employee 
Due to the lack of an insurable interest, the COLI system creates a 
scenario by which an employer is incentivized for her employee to die 
quickly. This rationale formed the basis for the court’s conclusion in 
Mayo. But even if some courts invalidate extreme forms of COLI or 
Dead Peasant policies, this improper incentive will usually exist in the 
context of COLI unless the employer has a true insurable interest in a 
key employee. 
The incentive that one might have to accelerate the death of the 
insured formed the basis for the insurable interest requirement. COLI 
 
 81. For a discussion on the tax breaks afforded to companies who collect profits on COLI, see 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
 82. Goldfinger (Eon Productions 1964). 
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policies create the same incentive for an employer: An employer could 
overwork an employee or become less concerned about dangerous 
working conditions. A company could place insured workers into more 
dangerous jobs or spend less money on safety accommodations. 
Additionally, COLI policies may have contributed to the decisions that 
several companies have made to refuse to provide employees with health 
care plans.83 
While some of these scenarios might seem extreme, it is not difficult 
to imagine a large corporation employing many of these tactics. Even small 
businesses might be susceptible to some of these problems; although not 
necessarily acting maliciously, the insurance policy might be a factor in the 
company’s decision to provide the employee with fewer accommodations. 
For example, if a company of forty workers is choosing whether to provide 
health insurance to its employees, it may be persuaded not to do so if it 
also happens to have a life insurance policy out on every employee. The 
small company may not actively want its employees to die, but may be 
incentivized enough by the death benefits and tax advantages that come 
from failing to provide health insurance. Moreover, the larger a company 
is, the stronger these incentives will be. Although it is impossible to know 
whether employers have purposely taken risks to ensure the accelerated 
death of their employees, with the COLI system the possibility exists for 
companies to exploit any possible advantage to increase profit. 
C. Taxpayers Fund COLI 
Additionally, COLI policies are problematic because they are 
expensive for taxpayers. Given that the policies lack a legitimate 
insurable interest, companies should not be able to profit at the expense 
of taxpayers. 
Employers and insurance companies can reap profits from COLI 
policies due to the tax benefits afforded to life insurance proceeds. Prior 
to 1996, companies benefitted from two distinct tax advantages: 1) the 
ability to deduct interest on loans taken out to finance COLI policies 
(“deductibility of interest advantage”); and 2) excluding death benefits 
received on policies from gross income when reporting federal taxes 
 
 83. As of October 2005, only forty-four percent of Wal-Mart’s 1.3 million workers in the United 
States were provided with health insurance. See Aaron Bernstein, A Stepped-Up Assault on Wal-Mart, 
Businessweek (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-10-19/a-stepped-up-assault-
on-wal-mart. Under the Affordable Care Act, companies with more than fifty employees will be 
required to provide health insurance for employees and dependents starting in 2014. See I.R.C. 
§ 4980H (2011). However, under new rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 
the Affordable Care Act, employers will not be subject to any penalties for failure to provide coverage 
if family coverage is unaffordable to those employees. See Robert Pear, Employers Must Offer Family 
Care, Affordable or Not, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2013, at A13. 
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(“death benefits exclusion”).84 The deductibility of interest advantage was 
eliminated by Congress through the enactment of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.85 The death benefits exclusion 
remains in place although Congress limited it through Congressional 
amendments to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (“PPA”). Because the 
death benefits exclusion is still in place, this Note primarily focuses on that 
tax advantage. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), any money received 
on the payout of a life insurance policy is excluded from gross income and 
not subject to federal income taxation.86 Therefore, the beneficiary of a 
policy collects any money received tax-free when an insured dies.87 The 
PPA narrowed the type of employees whose death benefits could be 
excluded from gross income.88 Part III of this Note analyzes the 
amendments to the PPA and the current state of the law and argues that 
the amendments have not removed all the tax benefits an employer enjoys, 
especially the benefits for large corporations, with the result that Dead 
Peasant policies have continued to thrive. 
Mayo demonstrates how larger companies can exploit the death 
benefits exclusion: the larger the company and the number of employees 
insured, the greater the likelihood that the company will profit. Wal-
Mart’s scheme—at issue in Mayo—was calculated: it insured every 
hourly employee, knowing that enough would die to allow Wal-Mart to 
turn a profit. This type of scheme benefits larger companies: with more 
employees, a company could be more confident that enough death 
benefits could accrue to help the company. Given that it is extremely 
unlikely that Wal-Mart considers every employee to be irreplaceable, the 
policy to insure all hourly employees is a statistical method of taking 
advantage of the tax benefits from COLI. Moreover, the case 
demonstrates how COLI policies might be more profitable if taken out 
on lower-income workers. Life expectancy is negatively correlated with 
income—the less money an individual makes the more likely that 
individual will die at an early age.89 
 
 84. See generally Craig E. Behrenfeld & Erica Good Pless, Employer-Owned Life Insurance After 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 83 Fla. B.J. 47, 47–48 (2009). 
 85. Id. 
 86. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1). 
 87. See In re CM Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578, 581 (D. Del. 2000), aff’d, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 
2002); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 88. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 89. The first famous international study of this correlation was conducted by Samuel H. Preston 
when he created the so-called “Preston Curve,” which analyzed rich and poor nations comparatively. 
See Samuel H. Preston, The Changing Relation Between Mortality and Level of Economic 
Development, 29 Population Stud. 231, 231 (1975). More recent studies demonstrate that the 
correlation between income and life expectancy in the United States has grown in the past couple of 
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Companies and insurers both profit from the tax system created by 
the death benefits exclusion. Because an employer can gain large sums of 
money by excluding death benefits from its reported income, it can take 
on more risk in purchasing policies on an employee, which allows 
insurance companies to profit through premiums. Due to the fact that 
insurers are not required to disclose anything about profits from issuing 
COLI policies, it is impossible to determine how much insurers profit. 
However, some data suggest that COLI insurance is more profitable than 
other types of insurance for the big insurers. For example, in the first 
nine months of 2002, Money Group Inc.’s sales of life insurance to 
companies increased by 128% to a total of $124 million, while all other life 
insurance sales fell three percent.90 Therefore, employers were not the only 
entities to abuse the system created by the death benefits exclusion—
insurance companies continued to issue COLI policies even under 
circumstances where the insurance might not be for key employees. 
The death benefits exclusion creates a public policy concern because 
taxpayers are funding COLI policies for large corporations and insurance 
companies. Tax revenues that would otherwise be collected are given back 
to the companies rather than taxpayers. The federal government could 
spend tax money gained by an elimination of the death benefits exclusion 
on fiscal programs or give it back to individuals in the form of tax credits. 
Even if COLI policies were rationally justified as key-man policies (this 
Note argues they are not), it is still problematic that the public must fund 
the tax breaks gained from the payout on these policies. The system 
created is one in which money flows from the taxpayers to support a 
gamble that allows insurance companies and large corporations to profit. 
Even if other public policy concerns were not present, at the very least 
corporations and insurers should have to take risks without the benefit of 
taxpayer money. 
D. Moral Reprehensibility of Life-Wagering 
In addition to the other policy concerns outlined in this section, 
gambling on employees’ lives is morally wrong. A modern rationale that 
lies behind the insurable interest requirement concerns “the immorality 
 
decades. See Sabrina Tavernise, Life Spans Shrink for Least-Educated Whites in U.S., N.Y. Times 
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/life-expectancy-for-less-educated-whites-in-us-
is-shrinking.html; see also Paul Krugman, Live Long and Prosper, N.Y. Times The Conscience of a 
Liberal Blog (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:36 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/live-long-and-
prosper-2. 
 90. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, How Life Insurance Morphed into a Corporate Finance 
Tool, Wall St. J. (Dec. 30, 2002), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/dec_30_one.htm. 
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inherent in gambling on the life of another human being.”91 Courts have 
applied this rationale, which dates back to nineteenth-century common 
law, when invalidating modern STOLI policies.92 
In the modern employment arrangement, many employees do not 
know the owners of the company that employs them. Therefore, COLI 
policies create parties that are as unfamiliar to each other as those of 
STOLI policies. Only in a small business context would the purchaser of 
a policy be well acquainted with an individual. Even in such a context, an 
employer holding COLI on its employees should be forced to prove it 
has a valid insurable interest; otherwise the policy is tantamount to a 
wagering contract on a human being’s life. 
III.  Analyzing the Congressional Response 
COLI and Dead Peasant policies continue to thrive as the death 
benefits exclusion remains in place. While Congress has acted to limit 
some of the profits employers and insurers can reap from the COLI 
system, the congressional response has not eliminated COLI. In fact, 
congressional action has created additional problems for the COLI 
system. This Part first summarizes two congressional responses created 
by the PPA: 1) the death benefits exclusion; and 2) the consent and 
notice requirements. This Part then analyzes the changes in the law, 
summarizing the current state of COLI and criticizing the inadequacy of 
congressional action. 
A. Congressional Response Created by the PPA 
1. The Narrowing of the Death Benefits Exclusion 
With the spotlight on Dead Peasant policies following Mayo, 
Congress set its sights on reforming COLI to end the practice of Dead 
Peasant policies. Prior to 2006, most companies benefitted from the 
death benefits exclusion, even after Congress ended the ability for 
companies to deduct interest on loans taken out to purchase COLI with 
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
in 1996.93 However, early legislative attempts specifically designed to 
address the problems of COLI failed.94 In 2006, Congress passed reform 
 
 91. Robert S. Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Modern Twists on the Insurable Interest 
Requirement for Life Insurance, 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 55, 60 (2010). 
 92. “A policy, obtained by a party who has no interest in the subject of insurance, is a mere wager 
policy.” Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E. 2d 535, 539 (2010) (quoting Ruse v. Mut. Benefit 
Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 516, 523 (1861)). 
 93. See discussion supra note 85. 
 94. In 2002, Congressman Gene Green (D-Tex.) introduced a bill requiring notification to 
employees for COLI policies, but the bill died in committee. See Rush, supra note 48, at 161 n.190. 
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through amendments to the Code as part of the PPA.95 The act primarily 
addressed employee pension plans, but the revisions to the Code were 
specifically designed to prevent the abuse of Dead Peasant policies.96 
The Code section 101(a)(1) provides the general rule for excluding 
insurance benefits from total income: “Except as otherwise provided 
in . . . subsection (j), gross income does not include amounts received 
(whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if 
such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured.”97 Because 
of this exclusion, individuals or companies can receive a payout on a life 
insurance contract without having to pay any federal income tax. 
The PPA amendments, which added section 101(j), limited this 
exclusion by shielding COLI policies from exemption under the general 
income provision.98 Therefore, a widow, for example, could continue to 
exclude death benefits received from her husband’s death on a policy in 
which she is a beneficiary under 101(a)(1). On the other hand, a company 
generally cannot exclude death benefits on a policy it took out on its 
employee under 101(j). 
However, Congress also created an exception to the exception; in 
other words, the 101(j) exception only applies to certain COLI plans, while 
others are still subject to the 101(a)(1) exclusion. Section 101(j)(2)(A) 
effectively allows a company to continue to exclude death benefits from 
total income in the following situations: 1) the insured under the policy 
was an employee within twelve months of the insured’s death; 2) the 
insured was a director; or 3) the insured was a “highly compensated 
employee,” defined as within the thirty-five percent of income-earners at 
the company.99 These limitations comport with the original rationale 
behind key-person COLI policies by not allowing employers to gain 
advantage of the death benefits exclusion for plans involving employees 
who are not integral to the company’s success. In sum, the PPA attempted 
to eliminate Dead Peasant policies by narrowing the range of employees 
 
Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) and Congressman Rahm Emanuel (D-Ill.) introduced similar bills in 
2003, but they never passed. Id. 
 95. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
 96. For a summary of the provisions of the PPA specifically addressing COLI policies, see 
generally Behrenfeld & Pless, supra note 84. 
 97. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2012). 
 98. Id. § 101(j)(1). 
 99. Id. § 101(j)(2)(A). The full text of subsection (A) states, “[e]xceptions based on insured’s 
status: Any amount received by reason of the death of an insured who, with respect to an applicable 
policyholder—(i) was an employee at any time during the 12-month period before the insured’s death, 
or (ii) is, at the time the contract is issued—(I) a director, (II) a highly compensated employee within 
the meaning of section 414(q) . . . or (III) a highly compensated individual within the meaning of 
section 105(h)(5), except that ‘35 percent’ shall be substituted for ‘25 percent’ in subparagraph (C) 
thereof.” Id. 
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eligible for an employer to claim death benefits tax-free, but still allows an 
employer to exclude such benefits for current or important employees. 
2. Consent and Notice requirements 
The PPA also amended the Code by requiring employers to obtain 
the consent of and give notice to employees before being eligible to claim 
the 101(a)(1) exclusion of gross income. Section 101(j)(4), which outlines 
notice and consent requirements, reads as follows: 
The notice and consent requirements of this paragraph are met if, 
before the issuance of the contract, the employee— 
(A) is notified in writing that the applicable policyholder intends to 
insure the employee’s life and the maximum face amount for which the 
employee could be insured at the time the contract was issued, 
(B) provides written consent to being insured under the contract and 
that such coverage may continue after the insured terminates 
employment, and 
(C) is informed in writing that an applicable policyholder will be a 
beneficiary of any proceeds payable upon the death of the employee.100 
 Therefore, in order for the 101(a)(1) exclusion to be triggered, an 
employer must obtain consent from the employee, even if it was not 
limited by the 101(j) exception. For example, a company would have to 
obtain the consent of its CEO even if she was the highest paid person in 
the company in order to claim the death benefits exclusion upon that 
CEO’s death. While the consent and notice requirements apply to all 
employees, Congress most likely enacted consent and notice requirements 
in response to the highly publicized Dead Peasant cases, such as that of 
Felipe Tillman.101 
B. Additional Problems Created by Congress 
1. Unanswered Questions Under the PPA 
While the congressional amendments are significant in limiting COLI, 
the current law does not go far enough in preventing the dangers of COLI 
outlined in Part II. First, the law leaves important questions unanswered, 
allowing large companies to utilize loopholes and continue to abuse COLI. 
Secondly, the law focuses too heavily on consent and notice but fails to 
consider the insurable interest requirement in COLI policies. 
The first problem not addressed by the PPA is the ability of large 
companies to exploit tax advantages. The new law creates a one-size-fits-
all standard for allowing companies to claim tax benefits under COLI 
 
 100. Id. § 101(j)(4). 
 101. See discussion supra notes 59–64. 
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policies because the statute does not distinguish between big and small 
businesses. The exceptions to the exception (or the provisions in 
section 101(j)(2)(A) that re-trigger the death benefits exclusion) apply 
regardless of the size of a company.102 Therefore, a company of any size 
may insure any employee within the top thirty-five percent of income-
earners of the company and collect tax-free death benefits at a later date. 
By failing to distinguish between company sizes, the advantages for 
big companies to abuse COLI remain in effect. For example, suppose a 
small business insures all forty of its employees under a life insurance plan. 
After the employee passes away, the small business would be denied the 
tax-free benefits for twenty-six of those employees and be able to collect 
tax-free benefits on only fourteen of the employees. In contrast, Wal-
Mart, who has approximately two million employees,103 would be able to 
collect tax-free death benefits on 700,000 employees. This discrepancy is 
problematic because it is not difficult to imagine how all forty employees 
for the small business might be integral to the company’s success, 
whereas a large percentage of the 700,000 Wal-Mart employees are likely 
to be easily replaceable. Therefore, there is no need to compensate Wal-
Mart in the case of the death of those employees because Wal-Mart does 
not have a legitimate insurable interest in the employees. 
Another important point not addressed by the PPA concerns how 
long an employee has to work at the company in order for the company 
to claim tax-free benefits. Part of what made Dan and Irma Johnson’s 
story104 seem so egregious to viewers of Michael Moore’s film, Capitalism: 
A Love Story, was the fact that Dan Johnson had only worked for Wal-
Mart for a couple of months.105 Under the PPA, the ability of Wal-Mart 
to insure Dan would continue so long as he was compensated in the top 
thirty-five percent of the company or employed within the last twelve 
months before his death. 
This problem could have been easily fixed by the new law. For 
example, Congress could have enacted a provision requiring a year’s 
worth of service as a reasonably low bar for an employer to claim tax-
free benefits. Requiring a certain amount of time would ensure that the 
employee is valuable to the company. One counterargument might be 
 
 102. The COLI amendments under the PPA do not distinguish between companies based on size. 
In comparison, the Affordable Care Act is an example of a law that distinguishes between large and 
small companies. See discussion supra note 83. Under that law, large companies comprise those with 
more than fifty employees and those large companies are subject to requirements to provide health 
insurance for employees. 
 103. Loren Berlin, Walmart’s How Big? What the Huge Numbers Really Mean, DailyFinance 
(May 28, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/05/28/walmarts-how-big-what-the-huge-
numbers-really-mean. 
 104. See supra notes 1–3. 
 105. See supra note 1. 
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that a newly-hired CEO would not be eligible for the gross income 
exclusion under this type of law. Therefore, the best way the law could 
be written is to create a length of time requirement that varies depending 
on the type of employees. Highly-compensated employees and directors 
could be subject to a very short time period such as one week, whereas 
rank-and-file employees could be subject to a longer requirement such as 
one year. 
2. Over-Focusing on Consent and Notice 
One potential reason that the above concerns were left unaddressed 
might be that Congress figured that requiring consent and notice solved 
most of the problems that lay behind Dead Peasant policies. After all, 
many of the popular stories documenting the abuse of COLIs taken out 
on rank-and-file employees involved people who did not consent and 
were not given notice to such policies.106 Some scholars predicted that the 
101(j)(4) requirements would standardize notice and consent across the 
insurance industry,107 but issues concerning whether consent was properly 
obtained still persist despite these requirements.108 
Congress should turn its focus to amending the PPA in a way that is 
consistent with the insurable interest requirement by forcing employers 
to demonstrate a true insurable interest in the life of the employee under 
the COLI policy before they gain any tax advantages. The prior 
amendments ultimately fail to restrict the ability of companies to take 
out COLI on employees. While Congress might have thought that the 
limitation for policies on employees within the top thirty-five percent of 
income-earners brought the tax breaks in line with the insurable interest 
requirement, this is an inadequate measure to ensure the policies have a 
valid insurable interest. The focus of Congress should turn toward 
strengthening the limitations to provide that a company may only enjoy 
tax breaks if the policies have a valid insurable interest. Such a 
requirement would ensure that employers would not be incentivized to 
have their employees die early. This would preserve the public policy 
rationales for the insurable interest requirement in the employment 
context. 
 
 106. The policies taken out on Dan Johnson, see supra notes 1–3, and Felipe Tillman, see supra 
notes 59–64, lacked notice and consent. 
 107. See, e.g., Behrenfeld & Pless, supra note 84. 
 108. For example, Irma Johnson’s lawsuit against Amegy Bank alleged that the bank knew that 
Johnson was cognitively impaired when he signed forms to comply with state consent requirements. 
Ashby Jones, ‘Dead Peasant’ Policies: The Next Big Thing in Insurance Litigation, Wall St. J. 
(Feb. 24, 2009, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/02/24/dead-peasant-policies-the-next-big-
thing-in-insurance-litigation. 
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Additionally, consent might not be a difficult barrier for Dead 
Peasant policies, especially in a poor economy. If a worker has been 
unemployed for more than one year and is offered a job so long as she 
consents to a life insurance policy, it is doubtful that the employee would 
withhold consent. It is hard to imagine a minimum-wage employee at 
Wal-Mart withdrawing consent for a life insurance policy, especially if 
consent to the policy is a precondition to a job offer. 
More importantly, obtaining consent has no bearing on the 
insurable interest question; simply because an employee agrees to an 
insurance policy does not change the interest the company has in the 
longevity of the employee. Giving proper consent and notice might make 
the policy seem less reprehensible in cases where the employee was 
never notified and never agreed to the policy, such as Dan Johnson’s 
policy. But the focus around consent and notice fails to address the 
central problem with COLI policies, which is the circumvention of the 
insurable interest requirement. The lack of consent and notice to an 
employee is not the greatest danger of Dead Peasant insurance; rather, 
the incentive a company might have to accelerate the death of its 
workers is the gravest policy concern. 
C. Current State of COLI: Dead Peasant Policies Are Not Dead 
Although the 2006 congressional amendments attempted to weaken 
the practice of Dead Peasant policies, there are indications that companies 
continue to exploit the death benefits exclusion. It is difficult to determine 
the extent to which companies are purchasing life insurance on their 
employees primarily because most companies are not required to disclose 
such information.109 Only banks are required to disclose ownership of 
Dead Peasant policies.110 While it is unknown how many COLI polices are 
being purchased by companies, the amount that banks have purchased 
indicates that COLI remains a profitable investment for companies. 
Banks continued to take out millions of dollars in insurance 
premiums on their own employees after 2006. In the first quarter of 2009, 
Bank of America held $17.3 billion in life insurance on its workers; 
Wachovia held $12 billion; JPMorgan Chase & Co. held $11.1 billion; 
and Wells Fargo held $5.7 billion.111 At the end of 2008, banks had 
$122.3 billion in life insurance on their employees.112 This figure was 
double what banks had at the end of 2004,113 demonstrating that the 2006 
amendments had little effect on the total money banks held in life 
 
 109. Schultz & Francis, supra note 54. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ellen E. Schultz, Banks Use Life Insurance to Fund Bonuses, Wall St. J., May 20, 2009, at C1. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
L - Burns_13 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:37 PM 
February 2014]    PEASANTS’ REVOLT 575 
 
insurance on their employees. Consultants estimate that over the coming 
decades, banks will receive $400 billion in total death benefits.114 
The continuation of Dead Peasant policies is not solely limited to 
banks. It is unclear how much money other companies have spent on life 
insurance for employees. However, the Wall Street Journal identified 
companies that still held substantial COLI assets in 2009 including Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, American International Group Inc. (“AIG”) and 
Tyson Foods Inc.115 If the figures that show the total amount of money 
banks hold are an indication of the benefits of COLI, it is likely that 
several other large corporations continue to collect billions of dollars in 
death benefits from COLI. 
Companies do not need taxpayer-funded death benefits to cover the 
loss of any of their employees and COLI policies should be viewed as 
illegal wagering schemes that evade the insurable interest requirement. 
Each state and Congress should act immediately to eliminate or weaken 
COLI. The need for action is heightened by the fact that the practice of 
abusing COLI has continued despite the 2006 amendments. 
IV.  Possible Solutions 
Three possible legal solutions exist to deal with eliminating or 
weakening Dead Peasant policies: 1) States can amend insurable interest 
statutes to explicitly block an employer from insuring its employees; 
2) Congress can amend the Pension Protection Act by eliminating 
section 101(j) entirely and remove the tax-free benefits enjoyed by 
companies for their COLI policies; or 3) Congress can amend the PPA 
less drastically by distinguishing between large and small companies and 
addressing other problems with the law that are discussed in Part III 
above. The first solution would be the most robust way to eliminate the 
abuse of COLI policies, but is extremely impractical since each state 
would have to amend its insurable interest laws separately. The second 
solution is the strongest way for the federal government to deal with the 
issue but might be politically unpopular. The third solution is the most 
practical, but would also be less effective than the other two options. 
A. Amending Insurable Interest Statutes State by State 
The first solution is for each state to eliminate the ability of an 
employer to insure its own employees. States could remove any language 
such as “substantial economic interest” from the insurable interest statutes 
or explicitly mention that an employment relationship is not enough to 
satisfy the insurable interest requirement. However, there may be 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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situations other than employment where a substantial economic interest 
qualifies for an insurable interest. Therefore, the best option is for each 
state to specifically address COLI policies. Most states have already 
enacted insurable interest statutes that are designed to address modern-
day STOLI arrangements. Therefore, states could easily add a section to 
the same set of statutes to eliminate COLI specifically while retaining the 
language for “substantial economic interest.” 
This solution is impractical because it would have to be enacted on a 
state-by-state basis; it is difficult for the federal government to alter 
insurance law. Insurance law has traditionally been regulated by the 
states.116 Technically, the federal government under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act can preempt state insurance law if the legislation specifically 
mentions that it intends to regulate insurance.117 However, it might be 
difficult to persuade Congress to pass a sweeping law that would alter the 
states’ insurable interest statutes. 
Absent federal legislation, all fifty states would have to eliminate 
COLI in order for this solution to be effective. If one state refuses to 
adopt this kind of insurable interest statute, then a large company could 
incorporate itself there in hopes of continuing the practice of insuring its 
employees.118 Although it is not clear whether the lure for favorable 
COLI laws would prompt a business to incorporate in certain states, this 
solution leaves room for companies to exploit favorable laws from states 
that have failed to enact laws to combat COLI. 
B. Congress Should Eliminate Section 101(j) 
The most effective solution is for Congress to amend the provisions 
of the Code to eliminate life insurance proceeds as being exempt from 
gross income for COLI policies. Congress has already specifically 
 
 116. For a comprehensive history of the development of state insurance regulation and issues of 
federalism around insurance regulation, see generally Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the 
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625 (1999). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or 
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance.”). 
 118. The decision of a company to re-incorporate in a different state to obtain favorable laws is not 
an uncommon phenomenon. For example, companies have re-incorporated in Delaware due to 
favorable corporate law and tax advantages. See John W. Edwards II, Busy Bees and Busybodies: The 
Extraterritorial Reach of California Corporate Law, 11 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) (discussing 
the advantages companies gain from Delaware corporate law); see also Leslie Wayne, How Delaware 
Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/ 
business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html. 
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addressed COLI policies in the 2006 amendments to the PPA.119 Here, 
Congress would be eliminating the practice entirely. 
This solution has numerous advantages. First, it would completely 
thwart the ability of large corporations to carry Dead Peasant policies. 
Companies would be greatly restrained in their efforts to profit from 
taxpayer funding through the death benefits exclusion on their COLI 
policies. Second, this solution would reinforce the insurable interest 
requirement. Any investor who accepts the transfer of a life insurance 
policy must still prove an insurable interest—employment would no 
longer be a basis for doing so. Third, because Congress is amending the 
law, employers in all states would be forced to abide by it. 
One counterargument against this solution might be that an 
elimination of section 101(j) is too drastic because it would thwart small 
companies from being able to insure their own employees. However, 
because employers in a modern age should be ready to replace any 
employee, there is no need for small companies to insure their own 
employees. Furthermore, eliminating the death benefits exclusion does 
not prevent a company from insuring its employees; it would only thwart 
the ability of that small company to claim any death benefits tax-free. If a 
company of ten people relies on all ten people and would be greatly hurt 
if any employee died, the company may still insure all ten employees. 
Under this solution, the company would merely lose the ability to claim 
death benefits tax free. 
Given that Dead Peasant policies are objectionable because 
companies profit from employees’ deaths, eliminating tax benefits would 
eliminate most of the public policy concerns associated with COLI. This 
solution naturally hurts bigger companies more because they are the 
ones who rely on the tax benefits in order to turn a profit. Large 
companies may still choose to insure CEOs or other highly compensated 
employees. Eliminating the tax benefits would likely lead to the gradual 
elimination of the practice and at least taxpayer money would not be 
supporting the practice. 
A disadvantage of this approach is that it may not be politically 
popular. The counterarguments raised above might be used to dismiss 
the solution and it may be seen as a drastic solution. Therefore, this Note 
proposes one final argument to fix the law with a more nuanced, less 
drastic congressional approach. 
C. Congress Should Amend the PPA 
The final solution is for Congress to amend the PPA by leaving the 
death benefits exclusion in place but limiting its application. This 
 
 119. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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solution accounts for the questions that are unanswered by the PPA 
identified in Part III, supra. 
First, the law should distinguish big companies from small 
companies. The one-size-fits-all nature of the law should change so that 
large companies cannot continue to exploit the profits available from 
Dead Peasant policies. Congress could amend the law in several different 
ways: 1) placing a cap on the number of employees whose death benefits 
might be claimed as exempt from gross income; 2) placing a cap on the 
total dollar amount of life insurance a company may take out; or 
3) creating a system where the larger a company is the more restricted it 
is in claiming death benefits. 
The third option outlined above would weaken the ability of 
companies to take out Dead Peasant policies because large corporations 
would face restrictions on how many rank-and-file employees they could 
ensure. The restrictions could include higher barriers for the exceptions 
already in place. For example, the law could require that all companies 
with more than 500 employees can only claim an exception for highly 
compensated employees if the employee is in the top ten percent of 
income-earners, rather than the top thirty-five percent. Alternatively, the 
law could restrict companies of more than 500 employees from claiming 
death benefits for current employees. A number of options could be 
explored, but taking account for the size of the company and restricting 
the tax benefits for larger companies would erode the ability of 
companies to abuse COLI. 
Second, the law should require an employee to have worked a 
certain length of time before a company could claim death benefits on an 
employee. As currently written, an employee could work for a company 
for two days and if a life insurance policy were taken out, the company 
could still claim death benefits in the case of death so long as the income, 
consent, and notice requirements were met. The law should require an 
employee to work for a company for a given time period, such as one year. 
Imposing a length of time requirement is consistent with the insurable 
interest requirement because it is reasonable to require that the employee 
work for the company for a certain period of time. 
Finally, the law should abolish or limit section 101(j)(2)(A)(i), the 
provision that exempts policies for current employees or employees who 
worked for the company within twelve months of their death. Companies 
should not be able to insure employees and collect tax benefits merely 
because the employee currently works for the company. Simply because 
an employee works for a company does not establish whether the 
company has an insurable interest. If Wal-Mart decides to insure a 
minimum-wage employee, the mere fact that the employee died while 
working for Wal-Mart does not establish a valid insurable interest. More 
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likely, large companies would insure these employees as a way to profit. 
At the very least, the statutory provision for claiming employees who 
died less than a year after leaving the company should be abolished. 
Though this Note has proffered some possible limitations, the precise 
time length, income percentage, or company size that would best eliminate 
the policy concerns of COLI policies can be determined by Congressional 
studies. While many of the time periods and figures proposed here may 
seem arbitrary, Congress needs to change the law to eliminate the public 
policy consequences associated with COLI. Congressional studies and 
fact-finding could help determine what figures and time periods would be 
acceptable to amend the law in the fairest way. This Note simply points 
out that distinguishing between large and small companies, imposing a 
length of time requirement for employees, and abolishing the exceptions 
for current employees and employees who worked at a company within a 
year of their death are all options that would fix the problems with the 
current law. Ultimately, as argued above, abolishing the death benefits 
exclusion is a more robust option, but this solution provides a more 
realistic, less drastic way for Congress to amend the law. 
Conclusion 
Life insurance on rank-and-file employees, or Dead Peasant 
insurance, abuses COLI. The practice is not consistent with the insurable 
interest requirement and amounts to a way for companies to profit off of 
employees by gambling on their lives. Courts and legislatures have 
already recognized the illegality of STOLI and should analyze COLI in 
the same way. States should abolish the ability of employers to insure 
employees under their insurable interest statutes. 
Congress has already shown itself willing to curb COLI abuse, but 
its efforts have been largely ineffective. The 2006 amendments to the 
PPA that target COLI do not adequately address the public policy 
concerns of COLI and create additional problems that give advantages to 
larger companies. Moreover, Dead Peasant policies persist as banks and 
other companies have continued to pour billions of dollars into the 
profitable enterprise. Congress should abolish the exception in the Code 
under section 101(j) which permits an employer to exempt COLI death 
benefits from gross income. At the very least, Congress should amend 
the law to take account for its flaws by distinguishing between company 
size, abolishing the provisions that allows companies to insure current 
employees, and imposing a requirement for length of time an employee 
must work at a company before being insured. 
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